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Abstract 
 
This  paper  shows  how  property  rights  insecurity  can  result  in  the  reproduction  of  local 
inequalities because of social matching in assets markets. A principal-agent framework is used 
to model the landlord’s decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land 
and contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with his tenant. These effects are 
quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show 
that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic 
lines, severely limiting access to land for the rural poor. Simulations suggest that improving 
tenure  security  would  increase  the  total  area  rented  to  the  poor  by  63%.  Property  rights 
insecurity hence not only affects asset owners, but also those with whom they might interact in 
the market. 
   1 
1. Introduction 
Much attention has recently been given to the economic and social costs of high inequality in 
developing countries. It has been argued that the impact of growth on poverty reduction is smaller when 
inequality is larger (Ravallion, 2001), and various theoretical arguments also suggest that high inequality 
might  hamper  growth  and  investments  (World  Bank,  2005).
1  One  of  the  most  striking  features  about 
inequality is its resilience (De Ferranti et al., 2004). An important question to be addressed is therefore how 
inequality gets to be reproduced.  
This paper provides evidence on one mechanism through which inequality is reproduced at the 
local level: the insecurity of property rights over agricultural land. It shows how such insecurity induces 
land rental market segmentation by social class, and as such reproduces inequality in access to land. This 
question is particularly relevant for Latin America, a region where income inequality is among the highest 
in the world (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002) and, in rural areas, is closely related to inequality in access 
to land (De Ferranti et al., 2004).  
We quantify this effect for local land rental markets in two regions of the Dominican Republic. 
For  each  local  market,  exhaustive  records  were  collected  on  all  land  transactions  with  information  on 
households  on  the  two  sides  of  the  market,  a  large  sample  of  non-participating  households,  and 
identification of potential  tenants that were constrained out of the market.  By simulating  the  effect of 
strengthening property rights on land rental market decisions, we show that large efficiency and equity 
gains can be achieved when formal titles are granted, land conflicts are reduced, and property rights are 
more effectively enforced. These simulations are based on an empirical estimation of the matching between 
landlords and tenants in these markets. The underlying theoretical model uses a principal-agent framework, 
in which the landlord chooses his tenant taking into account the incentive that the tenant has to squat and 
the risk that this would result in loss of the plot. Estimation results support the hypothesis that property 
rights insecurity not only reduces the level of activity on the land rental market, creating inefficiencies, but 
also affects the choice of tenant, confining land transactions within the same social class. Insecurity of 
property rights is then a powerful mechanism through which social inequalities are reproduced at the local 
level. 
 
2. Security of property rights and inequality 
The  literature  on  security  of  property  rights  and  inequality  has  evidenced  the  difference  in 
insecurity between rich and poor, with the rich and powerful better able to protect their assets than the poor 
                                                             
1  The  macro-empirical  evidence  based  on  cross-country  growth  remains  however  inconclusive  (see 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).   2 
(de Soto, 2000; Lanjouw and Levy, 2002; Goldstein and Udry, 2005). This difference  can lead  to the 
perpetuation  of  weak  property  rights  institutions  in  unequal  societies  as  rich  elites  are  not  necessarily 
interested in using the state to increase the security of property rights (Glaeser et al., 2003; Gradstein, 
2007).  
There is also a growing body of evidence showing the impact of security of property rights on 
investment and efficiency at the micro-level through their effects on investment incentives and access to 
credit  for  owners  (Feder  and  Feeny,  1991;  Besley,  1995;  Jacoby,  Li,  and  Rozelle  (2002);  Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002). The relation can sometimes be negative: Braselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 
(2002) show how land tenure insecurity in Burkina Faso induces investment in tree planting as a way of 
establishing  rights.  In  other  cases,  the  relation  is  weak  or  socially  confined:  Do  and  Iyer  (2007)  find 
positive but small investment effects of a property rights reform in Vietnam, and Carter and Olinto (2003) 
show  that  greater  property  rights  security  only  leads  to  positive  investment  effects  among  wealthier 
producers. But there is also evidence that the relation can be positive and large: Field (2005, 2007) and 
Galiani  and  Schargrodsky  (2005)  find  positive  effects  of  stronger  property  rights  on  labor  supply  and 
housing investments in urban squatting settings in Peru and Argentina. Di Tella et al. (2007) uncover a 
potentially  important  mechanism  whereby  this  happens  as  property  rights  security  enhances  people’s 
beliefs in the market economy.  
A vicious circle of rising inequality can then emerge if inequality leads to differential property 
rights security between rich and poor (with weak interest from elites to strengthen property rights), which 
then  induces  (via  incentives,  access  to  credit,  and  beliefs)  a  growing  divergence  in  investment  and 
efficiency.   
This paper uncovers a different channel through which property rights insecurity can lead to the 
perpetuation  of  inequality.  It  shows  that  property  rights  insecurity  over  productive  assets  can  have  an 
impact not only on direct use of assets by owners, but also on how they select households with whom they 
decide  to  interact  in  markets for  these  assets. As such  it  relates  to papers  that  consider the effects of 
property rights insecurity on land market activity (Gine, 2005; Conning and Robinson, 2007). In this case, 
the risk of loss of the land to the tenant induces landlords to select households from the same social class, 
reproducing social inequalities. We recognize that insecurity can be caused not only by lack of formal titles 
but also by lack of informal enforcement of property rights and by the recent history of land conflicts.
2 The 
paper measures the extent to which land rental market activity can be socially biased as a consequence of 
the lack of formal or informal property rights, contributing to reproduce social inequalities. 
                                                             
2 Most papers in the literature focus either on the impact of formal titles or look at informal property rights. 
With the exception of Lanjouw and Levy (2002), the different dimensions of property rights security are 
often not considered together.     3 
 
3. The land rental market and property rights insecurity in the Dominican Republic 
The highly unequal distribution of land ownership in many Latin American countries suggests that 
there is room for redistribution of land under cultivation through the land rental market. Yet, only 12% of 
agricultural land is rented in Latin America and 14% in the Dominican Republic, as opposed to 67% in 
Belgium and 41% in the United States (FAO, 1981). Field observations provide plenty of evidence that 
land markets do not function well in the Dominican Republic. In our dataset, 64% of all households that do 
not rent to others would like to rent more land from others. In spite of this, casual observations in these 
communities  suggest  that  there  are  extensive  tracts  of  underused  land,  mainly  in  the  hands  of  large 
landowners who use it at most for extensive grazing when it could be rented out more profitably.   
Furthermore,  Latin  American  land  rental  markets  are  often  segmented,  with  the  land  being 
transacted  mainly  among  people  of  the  same  socio-economic  class  (Carter  and  Chamorro  (2001)  for 
Nicaragua).  We hypothesize  that this segmentation deepens with  insecurity of property rights.  Table 1 
shows the correspondence in living standards of landlords and their tenants in our survey, distinguishing 
between communities with and without recent land invasions.
3 The first panel shows that in communities 
with recent land invasions, there is a very strong positive assortative matching along living standards. More 
than half of the transactions are between members of the same class. Less than 7 % of the land transacted 
by the rich is rented out to the poor (low living standard), and vice versa. By contrast, transactions are more 
equally distributed across classes in communities without land invasions (second panel), with 41% of the 
plots rented out by the rich going to the poor. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the proportion of 
observations along the diagonal is larger in communities with recent land conflicts at the 1% significance 
level.  
The insecurity of property rights that induces fear among landlords to lose their land is not unique 
to the Dominican Republic. It characterizes many Latin American countries with agrarian laws put into 
place during the period of state-led expropriative land reforms and institutional weaknesses in the land 
administration  and  judicial  systems.  These  agrarian  laws  cause  property  rights  insecurity  because  of 
regulations  on  land  ownership  (e.g.,  in  many  countries,  laws  grant  ownership  rights  to  occupants),  or 
because of inconsistencies between constitutional constraints on land use to merit ownership and the Civil 
Code (e.g.,  Brazil and Venezuela). Lack of titles, outdated or overlapping titles, and slow, costly,  and 
inaccessible legal systems further impede property rights security (Macours et al., 2002).  In the Dominican 
Republic, land ownership and distribution have been affected by the different property rights regimes of 
successive foreign powers (Spanish, French, and United States) that were introduced without abolishing the 
                                                             
3  Section 4.3 explains how living standard classes are defined.   4 
previous system, and by the redistributive land reform initiated in the 1960s that remained inconclusive. 
Within a few years of the reform, redistribution of expropriated land, although now officially owned by the 
Dominican state, was stalled and the former - often absentee - owners maintained possession of most of the 
property. This invited land invasions by the rural population who claims that this land is property of the 
Dominican  people  and  hence  fundamentally  theirs.  Legislation  remains  in  place  that  allows  for 
expropriation of under-used land, creating further incentives for land invasions (Gill, 2000). The resulting 
climate of property rights insecurity also induced squatting on other lands.  
In the regions studied, invasions have had mixed results. In some cases, invaded land has been 
vacated by (military) force, but more often, invasions have led to some type of negotiated settlement, or 
long-term possession with continued uncertainty on property rights. In cases of squatting, property rights 
enforcement is also often weak, even when landlords have verifiable property rights. When a tenant seeks 
to squat, attempts to resolve the conflict can pass through different stages. First landlords might try to evict 
the tenant personally, possibly with the help of his family. In case this is unsuccessful, they might resort to 
community organizations to mediate the conflict. And in a next step, cases can be taken to court. The 
outcome  of  each  of  these  processes  is  typically  far  from  certain.  Even  in  cases  when  landlords  have 
verifiable  property  rights,  enforcement  can  be  weak,  in  part  because  the  law  often  leaves  room  for 
competing claims. E.g., in a number of squatting cases that went through litigation, court decisions favored 
poor squatters over rich landlords, based on land reform legislation that provides strong rights to occupants. 
On the other hand, among the poor there is also a perception that the justice system in other cases has 
favored the rich.  
There  is  a  relatively  strong  correlation  between  the  recent  occurrence  of  land  invasions,  and 
squatting. Of the 18 communities in the dataset, 8 communities had a land invasion in the last 5 years, and 
in 7 of these 8 communities there were also cases of land squatting. And only 3 other communities of the 
remaining  10  had  a  case  of  squatting  in  the  last  5  years.  Extensive  field  interviews  revealed  that  in 
communities with land invasions, local conflict resolution would often favor squatters, further increasing 
the incentives to squat, and therefore augmenting the general perception of property rights insecurity. It is 
important to note, however, that there is only a handful of plots on which tenants attempted to squat in any 
of these communities. This is not surprising given that landlords attempt to avoid such cases by carefully 
choosing their tenants.
4  
The impediments  to land rental compound with the fact  that land rental  markets, by the very 
nature of the traded good, are local and small. Options are limited for landlords, and that is why they may 
end-up choosing not to rent-out. Conversely, potential tenants’ opportunities to have access to a plot of land 
                                                             
4 Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain quantitative data on the specific number of squatting cases, or 
the likelihood of eviction in these cases.   5 
are limited by the relationships they have with landlords in the community. Hence, access to land for a 
particular tenant will not only depend on his own characteristics, but also on the  characteristics of  all 
available landlords and all other potential tenants in the community, and on the institutional context that 
might influence the landlords’ preferences.  
 
4.  Modeling the land rental market in the context of insecurity of property rights 
To guide the empirical specification, we develop a model that focuses on enforcement through 
social  ties  as  an  explanation  for  the  observed  market  segmentation.  In  deciding  whom  to  rent  out  to, 
landlords take into account the probability of losing their land. They can pay a premium to reduce the 
incentive to squat.
5  We assume that enforcement against squatting is easier for members of the same socio-
economic class, and that this holds for landlords from all classes.
 6  This is because people from the same 
class depend on each others for various other interactions, such as loans, referrals on labor markets, and 
mutual insurance.  
As markets are local, landlords in any village only face a limited number of potential tenants, and 
may have to compete for the best tenants.  In equilibrium, each landlord’s strategy must be optimal given 
the strategies of the other landlords. Because of the localized nature of land rental transactions, we assume 
that landlords and tenants have full information on asset ownership and on the productive capacity of all 
potential  partners.  The  assumption  of  perfect  information  about  these  characteristics  is  warranted  for 
village communities in the Dominican Republic, as information sharing (gossiping) is an inherent part of 
social life. Furthermore, in the last 10 years, few new households have immigrated into the communities 
studied here. Studies in other parts of the world find that information on attributes of others is widely 
available in village communities (Bardhan, 1984; Bell, 1988; and Lanjouw, 1999).   
Ackerberg  and  Botticini  (2002)  pointed  out  the  importance  of  accounting  for  endogenous 
matching between landlords and tenants when analyzing land rental markets. They account for matching 
along one trait and instrument using regional differences reflecting the context. Relatively little empirical 
work has been done on matching accounting for more than one trait at the individual level.
7  Two papers 
                                                             
5 In particular, landlords can provide incentives not to squat through the contract terms (e.g., by providing 
services to the tenants for the commercialization of their crops). 
6 Given that an alternative assumption might be that enforcement against squatting is only important for 
rich landlords renting to poor tenants, the  empirical  analysis will specifically  test for such asymmetric 
effects. 
7 Most  empirical work analyzing matching in the labor market estimates aggregate matching functions 
(explaining the number of matches in the labor market as a function of unemployment and vacancies), or 
individual transitions using panel data (see, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an overview). Some 
work on marriage market matching also models individual transitions (e.g., Wong, 2003).    6 
empirically estimate the individual determinants of matching in the marriage market to test the hypothesis 
of assortative mating (Becker, 1973). Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) estimate a conditional logit that models the 
matching process as a choice by one of the partners, determined by the absolute value of the differences in 
traits between the chooser and potential matches. It therefore corresponds to a one-directional decision 
process that does not account for utility maximization of the other side, nor for competition in the market. 
In large markets, the effect of such competition (i.e., the probability that your preferred choice is already 
matched with somebody else that he/she prefers) is likely to be negligible. There always exists another 
potential partner with (almost) the same characteristics who will be a close substitute for the most preferred 
match. But, in thinner markets, this might not be the case. Furthermore, partner selection differs from a 
discrete choice problem because the choice of a spouse is mutual and because different individuals cannot 
choose the same alternative. Suen and Lui (1999) explore a method that directly derives from the Becker 
model of efficient competitive matching in the marriage market, i.e, a matching process that maximizes 
marital output. This model has the advantage that it takes the reservation utility of potential partners into 
account, but does not allow including the non-chosen alternatives in the estimation.  
In the local land markets that we consider here, many potential tenants end up not being matched 
to a landlord/plot. Our empirical specification is therefore based on a principal-agent model in which the 
landlord makes an offer to the tenant, and the tenant accepts or rejects. This modeling approach is justified 
by field observations that confirmed that it is the landlord who takes the first step and determines the terms 
of the contract. Competition among landlords comes through the reservation utility of tenants, as tenants 
that are wanted by many landlords will have a higher reservation utility. Hence, while our model is similar 
to Jepsen and Jepsen’s in modeling the choice by one partner, it differs in accounting for the reservation 
utility  of  tenants  and  competition  among  landlords  in  the  market.  The  model  also  incorporates  the 
possibility of choosing not to match, and allows for matching along various characteristics. 
 
4.1. Theoretical model 
As few landlords in the dataset rent out more than one plot at a time, all landlord plot rental 
decisions  are  treated  independently,  and  i  designs  both  a  landlord  and  his  plot.  The  landlord-tenant 
relationship can be thought of  as emerging from a two-step decision process (Figure 1).  The  landlord 
decides whether to rent out plot i or not and, if he chooses to rent, to which tenant j to offer the contract. He 
also decides the contract terms. He can offer the tenant a premium above his reservation utility to provide 
an  incentive  for  non-squatting.  Tenant  j  decides  whether  to  squat,  i.e.,  stay  on  the  land  and  continue 
cultivating without paying the rent, or not to squat.  The probability of success in squatting depends on the 
plot’s property rights security. Squatting entails a cost in the loss of benefits from future social interactions.    7 
If squatting is successful, the tenant de facto keeps the land in perpetuity.  If squatting fails, however, the 
tenant has to pay its due rent and return the land.   
Squatter not evicted
Squats Squatter evicted
Rents Does not squat Rental relationship
Landord/plot i
Does not rent Landlord cultivates
Tenant 1
Tenant j
Tenant J
 
Figure 1. Landlord and tenant decisions and possible outcomes 
The  contractual  arrangement  is  a  rental  contract  for  one  period.  The  potential  loss  of  land  is 
however a long-term asset loss.   Let   i  be the expected annual flow of income from the land (under the 
best possible arrangement) in a given market, for whoever controls the land.
8  We first solve for the tenant’s 
decision, which will be anticipated by the landlord.  
 
The tenant’s decision to squat 
Each tenant j has an opportunity cost  wj  outside the rental market. Landlord i can choose to offer 
the tenant a premium dwij  above his opportunity cost if he does not squat. By squatting, the tenant loses the 
benefit of future social interactions 
  
R  ij ( ) that we assume to depend on the social distance 
  
 ij between 
the landlord and the tenant.  If squatting is successful, the tenant keeps the plot of land, which has a value 
of   i .  If squatting fails, however, the tenant returns the land and must accept an income equal to his 
opportunity cost wj .  The expected return U to a tenant who decides to squat ( sij = 1) is thus: 
E U sij =1 ( ) =
1
1  
pr Si =1 ( ) i + wj   R  ij ( ) ( ) , 
where 
  
pr Si =1 ( ) is the probability that squatting on plot i is successful, and     the discount factor. If he 
does not  squat,  the  tenant receives  wj + dwij , where  dwij  is the premium for not squatting.  With an 
expectation of constant premium for not squatting, the tenant’s decision to squat is expected to be the same 
                                                             
8 This life-time value of the plot could be endogenized in a dynamic model.  The rental market would then 
be modeled as an annual repeated game, where a landlord chooses a tenant with the described process 
every year. However, unless one introduces some genuine dynamic process, the dynamic model gives no 
further insights than a static model.  The tenant’s decision to squat would be the same every year, and 
hence either he squats the first year or never squats.  We therefore keep a simple static model.    8 
every year, and hence either he squats the first year or never squats. The expected return under no squatting 
( sij = 0) is thus:  
  E U sij = 0 ( ) =
1
1  
wj + dwij ( ). 
Assume some unobserved “distaste” for squatting    j  in addition to these economic returns. The tenant’s 
optimal decision is thus to: 
squat sij =1   if   pr Si =1 ( ) i   R  ij ( )  dwij     j > 0
not squat sij = 0  otherwise
 
 
 
   
  (1) 
 
The landlord’s decision to rent out and the choice of tenant 
The tenant decides to squat or not based on his best guess of future expected value and his taste for 
squatting.  The taste for squatting of individual potential tenants is not known to the landlord.
9  Assuming 
that it follows a distribution with cumulative function F(.), the landlord’s appreciation of the risk that tenant 
j may squat on his plot i is given by: 
  pr sij =1 ( ) = F pr Si =1 ( ) i   R  ij ( )  dwij ( ) .  (2) 
Knowing  the  squatting  risk  and  productive  capacity  of  all  potential  tenants,  the  landlord  can 
proceed to compare alternative rental contracts.   
Let   ij  be the net return to the land for the landlord when the land is cultivated under a rental 
agreement with tenant j,  i0  when exploited by the landlord alone.
10  The landlord’s utilities for renting out 
plot i to tenant j, 
  
Vij , and for not renting it, 
  
Vi0, are: 
Vij =  ij +
 
1  
 i   1  pr sij =1 ( ) ( )dwij   pr sij =1 ( )pr Si =1 ( )
 
1  
 i ,  (3) 
Vi0 =  i0 +
 
1  
 i .  (4) 
                                                             
9 Hence there is some asymmetric information, but – in contrast with most of the labor literature – it cannot 
be reduced through a costly search. 
10   i0 is smaller or equal to   i  as the later refers to the return under the best possible arrangements, while 
the former refers to the return when the plot is cultivated by the landlord alone.   9 
The  landlord’s  problem  consists  in  deciding  to  rent  out  or  not,  and  if  he  decides  to  rent,  in 
choosing j and the premium to offer this tenant in order to maximize expected utility from plot i: 
 
 
EVi = max
j=0,1,K,JVij .  (5) 
This can be solved in two steps.  First, the landlord defines the optimal premium  dwij  to give any 
potential tenant j, should he decide to offer him a contract.  This is the solution to maximizing (3), or: 
min
dwij
1  pr sij =1 ( ) ( )dwij + pr sij =1 ( )pr Si =1 ( )
 
1  
 i
 
   
 
    ,               (6) 
where the probability of squatting  pr sij =1 ( )  is given in (2).  This shows that the optimal premium  dw ￿ ij  
and the probability of squatting are a function of the plot characteristics, through the term pr Si =1 ( ) i , and 
of the social interaction between landlord and tenants, through  R  ij ( ). This solution illustrates the tradeoff 
for the landlord between giving a large premium and the risk of squatting.  Plots with higher values and 
weaker ability to enforce property rights (higher probability that squatting will be successful) garner a 
higher premium to the tenant, and tenants with lower cost to squatting R are offered a higher premium to 
counteract their incentive to squat.  This mechanism thus reinforces the landlords’ incentives to choose 
tenants with whom they have stronger ties. 
11  
Second, the landlord decides on whether to rent out his land and to which tenant j if he does rent 
out, comparing utilities under the different options, as in (5), given the solution to (6) for each potential 
tenant. 
 
4.2. Empirical specification 
  Assuming a linear approximation for the utility functions, we write: 
  Vij = Xij  + Xi1 1 + µij   Vij
  + µij   
and   Vi0 = Xi0 0 + µi0   Vi0
  + µi0 ,  
where  Xij  represents the variables in (3) that characterize either the tenant or the tenant-landlord pair, and 
Xi1 and  Xi0  the variables that characterize the landlord/plot in expressions (3) and (4), respectively, and 
µij  and  µi0  are unobserved terms to the econometricians.   
                                                             
11 Hence, the predictions of the model do not change for cases in which landlords are unable to offer a 
premium.   10 
  Elements of  Xij  include the determinants of the return to land   ij , of the probability of squatting 
pr sij =1 ( ) , and the expected transfer of value through squatting  pr sij =1 ( )pr Si =1 ( ) i . They correspond 
to the productive assets of the tenant, possibly some interaction between the assets of the tenant and the 
landlord/plot that might affect the return to land, the social distance between the landlord and the tenant 
that affect the probability of squatting, and its interaction with the plot characteristics and its formal and 
informal property rights.  Elements of  Xi1 include the landlord and plot characteristics that affect the value 
of the plot   i , the return   ij , and the probability that the landlord will be able to defeat an attempt by the 
tenant to squat.  Finally, elements of  Xi0  include the determinants of the return to land when managed by 
the landlord alone,   i0 , and the value of the plot   i , i.e., the characteristics of the plot itself and the 
landlord productive assets. 
  We  assume  that  the  vector   µi = µi0,µi1,K,µiJ ( )  follows  a  Generalized  Extreme  Value 
distribution, with the alternative choices grouped into two sets, 
  
0 { }  for not renting out, and   = 1,K,J { } 
for renting to any potential tenant available to i. This leads to a nested logit model, which corresponds to 
the landlord’s decision depicted in figure 1. 
  The model is written: 
 
 
P Vij = max
k=0,K,JVik ( ) =
e
Xij 
e
Xik 
k    
e
 Ii+Xi 
e
 Ii+Xi  +1
, for 
  
j   , 
and  
 
P Vi0 = max
k=0,K,JVik ( ) =
1
e
 Ii+Xi  +1
, for j = 0,   
where  Ii = ln e
Xik 
k    
 
   
 
     is the inclusive value that summarizes the characteristics of all potential tenants 
for landlord i,  Xi = Xi0,Xi1 { } , and   =  1   0 .  
The model can be decomposed into two logit models. In the lower level model, the conditional 
choice  among  tenants  for  a  landlord  that  would  rent  (
  
di =1)  follows  a  conditional  logit  model.    The 
probability that a landlord chooses tenant j for his plot i ( dij =1;dik = 0, k   j ) is:  
P dij =1 di =1 ( ) =
e
Xij 
e
Xik 
k    
.  (7)   11 
Note that this expression does not include any landlord/plot characteristics  Xi1 separate from its interaction 
with the tenant characteristics.  This is because terms that affect the return to land with any tenant cancel 
out in the landlord choice of tenants, conditional on the decision to rent out.  
In the upper level model, the landlord chooses among the alternative of renting out (
  
di =1) and not renting 
out, following the logit model: 
  P di =1 ( ) =
e
 Ii+Xi 
e
 Ii+Xi  +1
.  (8) 
Whether to rent out or not depends on the landlord’s characteristics  Xi  that affect the return to 
land under tenancy or in independent exploitation and on the utility that could be derived from putting the 
land in tenancy, given the available choice of tenants, as summarized by the inclusive value  Ii . 
 
4.3.  Data  
An indirect survey approach was used to obtain data on communities, each household, and each 
plot within these communities. The indirect approach relies on the fact that a lot of private information is 
public  at  the  level of  the community. Hence, selected  informants from  the  community  can be used to 
answer  questions  about  private  matters  of  individual  community  members  that  are  locally  public 
knowledge.  A  similar  approach  has  recently  been  used  to  study  land  market  activity  by  Bardhan  and 
Mookherjee (2005). Data collection started with a census of all 2523 households in 18 communities, and a 
census  of  all  the  plots  that  they  own,  rent-in,  and  rent-out.    This  information  allows  classification  of 
households  into  366  landlords,  465  tenants,  and  1692  other  households.  The  data  set  for  the  analysis 
consists  of  information  on  all  landlords,  all  tenants,  and  910  other  households  randomly  sampled  by 
community. For those households that do not rent land to others, we know whether they would like to rent 
land  from  others  (or  rent  more  land  than  they  currently  do)  under  the  most  common  contract  in  the 
community. This allows us to control for the demand side in the estimation.  The information is used to 
define the potential tenants (525 households out of the 910 households not currently engaged in the tenancy 
market), in addition to the 465 actual tenants.  The number of potential tenants varies from 13 to 146 across 
the  communities.  The  set  of  potential  landlords  consists  of  all  land-owning  households,  whether  they 
currently participate or not in the land rental market.  Together they own 737 plots, of which 316 are rented 
out to community members.
12  
                                                             
12  This excludes the 163 plots that are owned by households living in the community but rented out to 
households outside of the community. Many of these plots are not located in the landlord’s community. By 
excluding  these  plots,  the  empirical  results  are  only  representative  for  rental  transactions  within  local 
markets. As such, the results of the paper only allow concluding that property rights insecurity contributes   12 
A short community questionnaire was used to gather data about the history of land conflicts in 
each  of  the  communities,  including  those  that  involved  absentee  owners.  This  information  was 
complemented with extensive qualitative interviews that allow characterizing the nature and history of the 
land invasions. The communities are located in two regions that have similar characteristics.  Both regions 
have  mainly  seasonal  crops,  relatively  intensive  agricultural  production  with  high  input  use  (fertilizer, 
pesticides,  labor),  and  multiple  crops  per  year.  A  substantial  share  of  agricultural  production  is 
commercialized, agricultural income is an important part of the households’ budgets, and in both regions 
there is an excess demand for land. In one of the regions (where rice is the main crop), the land reform of 
the 60s played a larger role. Nevertheless, land ownership inequality remains high in both regions, with 
community-level land Gini coefficients ranging from 0.63 to 0.94, and the cumulative share owned by the 
10% largest holders is on average 80%.   
The  dataset  contains  information  on  demographic  characteristics  of  the  household,  and 
characteristics of all the plots that they own or rent from others.  In addition, the informant was asked to 
assign each household according to their overall living standard to one of four possible living standard 
categories: “very low”, “low”, “regular”, and “high”. To obtain a measure of class, the informants were 
instructed explicitly not to consider the productive assets of the households to judge their living standard. 
Instead it was agreed they should be considering broad indicators of consumption or expenditures such as 
characteristics  of  their  house,  food,  health  care,  transport  means,  and  the  level  of  education  of  the 
children.
13 Because few households were categorized as "very low", we consider the "very low" and "low" 
living standards together as one category.  
Landlords and tenants clearly differ by the amount of land they own.  Landlords own on average 
1.6 plots on 2.27 ha, while tenants own 0.3 plots on 0.3 ha.  Landlords and tenants do not correspond 
however to dramatically different welfare classes, as can be seen in Table 1.  33% of the landlords are from 
the lower class, 39% from the intermediate, and 28% from the higher class, while those numbers are 29%, 
43%, and 27% for tenants.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to the reproduction of land access inequality within these communities. While landlords who rent out plots 
located outside of their communities are likely to rely on different enforcement mechanisms in the presence 
of property rights insecurity, it seems unlikely that these mechanisms would have an opposite effect on 
inequality. 
13  The  living  standard  measure  was  regressed  on  these  indicators  which  shows  strong  correlations. 
Productive assets (land, education, etc.) are not significant, once the other factors are controlled for. This 
shows that indeed the informant considered welfare measures, as opposed to measures of the productive 
assets, when categorizing the different households.    13 
  Combining  each  actual  landlord-plot  with  his  corresponding  potential  tenants,  from  the  same 
community,  gives  almost  24,000  potential  matches.    The  variables  used  in  the  estimations  are  the 
following: 
•  Plot characteristics that affect production  xi
p ( ) are the plot size, and a dummy for whether the plot has 
irrigation potential, measured by the proximity to an irrigation canal or natural stream. 
•  Landlord’s  and  tenant’s  productive  characteristics  and  assets 
  
zi,z j ( )  are  the  gender,  age,  and 
education of the household head, the number of adult household members, and machinery ownership 
characterized by two dummy variables for owning any machinery and owning a lot of machinery.  In 
addition, we consider for landlords the area they own and for tenants the number of other plots they are 
cultivating as an indicator of their opportunity cost. Finally a dummy variable, “agricultural engineer”, 
identifies the few households in which the head owns a lot of machinery and has a university degree.  
•  The social distance between the landlord and the tenant 
  
 ij ( ) is captured by two dummy variables: 
one  variable  equaling  1  for  matches  between  people  with  a  regular  and  high  living  standard,  or 
between people with  a low  and regular living standard;  the other variable  equaling 1 for matches 
between high and low living standards.
14  
•  Plot/landlord  characteristics  that  affect  the  probability  that  squatting  will  be  successful 
  
xi
S ( )  are 
dummy variables for whether the plot has a title, which measures the formal strength of the property 
right to the plot; whether the landlord has a large family in the community, which is a proxy for the 
informal strength of the property rights; and whether there were cases of land invasions during the last 
five years in the community, which also proxies informal property right strength. Finally, we include a 
regional dummy for the rice region, since it is a region with a long history of land reforms and related 
conflicts.  
The  explanatory  variables 
  
Xij ( )  for  the  lower  level  model  (7)  include  social  distance 
  
 ij ( ), 
interaction terms 
  
 ijxi
S ( ) to test the hypothesis that social distance matters more when the insecurity of 
property rights is higher, and tenants’ characteristics  zj ( ). Tenant characteristics affect the decisions of 
landlords both through their effect on the total expected profit and through their effect on the tenants’ 
reservation utility, and as such can have offsetting effects on the landlord’s net return   ij . We also include 
                                                             
14 The specification assumes that effects of low-regular and regular-high matches are similar, and that the 
effects  of  social  distance  are  symmetric.  Both  assumptions  were  empirically  tested  and  could  not  be 
rejected (see section 5).       14 
some interaction terms  xi
pzj ( )  to account for the fact that tenant’s endowments might be more important 
for cultivating large and irrigated plots.
15   
The  explanatory  variables 
  
Xi ( )  for  the  upper  level  model  (8)  include  plot’s  and  landlord’s 
characteristics  xi
p,zi ( ) and the insecurity of property rights variables 
  
xi
S ( ).   
 
4.4. Econometric issues 
While having a complete characterization of the land market presents great advantage in terms of 
effectively observing the two sides of all the matches, and characterizing the opportunities, it does raise 
some econometric problems. In our sample, as in the real world of a community, all potential tenants in any 
community consist of a finite number of persons who are common to all  landlords of the community.  
Hence the unobserved terms 
  
µij  in equation (2) could be correlated across landlords i if they contain some 
tenant j’s unobserved characteristics.  We will thus proceed with an estimation of the model with tenant 
fixed effects as an alternative to the estimation with tenants’ characteristics. 
The second econometric problem comes from a possible negative correlation between the terms 
  
µij  due to the fact that tenants do not cultivate more than a few plots.  Hence if one landlord contracts with 
a given tenant, it reduces the probability that another landlord can contract with the same tenant.  This 
creates a negative correlation across landlords’ decisions for the same tenant.  In the core estimation, we 
account for this competition by inclusion of a variable measuring the number of other plots the tenant is 
currently cultivating.  This  is  motivated by the assumption that each  landlord  takes the decision of the 
tenants and of the other landlords as given. Inclusion of such a variable cannot be done with the tenant’s 
fixed effects model because of collinearity, and hence the fixed effect estimation gives consistent, but not 
efficient, results (McFadden, 1999).   
Finally,  as  we  used  an  indirect  survey  approach  and  relied  on  an  informant  to  obtain  the 
information for all the households of his community, one may suspect an informant effect that could create 
correlation between the error terms of the observations from the same community.  In the lower level 
model, an additive informant effect would not pose a problem since all potential tenants would have the 
same term that cancels out in their comparison. In addition, we check for robustness of the results allowing 
                                                             
15 In addition, πij, and hence the matching between landlords and tenants, could potentially depend on the 
complementarities or substitutability between the productive asset  endowments of the  landlord and the 
tenant, in line with Becker’s theory of assortative matching in the marriage market. E.g. landlords with low 
labor endowments might prefer tenants with high labor endowments, or vice versa. We therefore test for 
interactions between landlord and tenant’s assets in section 5.2.      15 
for correlation of observations obtained from the same informant.  In the upper-level estimation, we check 
for the possibility of either correlated errors or an informant fixed effect.  
 
4.5. Identification 
Our model assumes that the variables used to measure informal and formal property rights are not 
correlated with possible unobserved factors that affect decisions on the land rental markets. This can be 
motivated by the specific choice of variables, the empirical specification, and the specific context in the 
regions of study. The presence of family, the first measure of informal enforcement, is a result of historical 
fertility and migration decisions of other households in the community, that can arguably be considered a 
given for landowners making decisions in the land rental markets. Land invasions, our second indicator, are 
measured at the level of the community, and reflect past large-scale conflicts. We only consider large-scale 
land  invasions,  rather  than  past  individual  cases  of  squatting,  as  the  latter  are  endogenous  to  past 
equilibrium contract choices. In contrast, interviews with participants of the large-scale invasions revealed 
that these  invasions were escalations of lingering  conflicts between  the  community  and large absentee 
landlords. Such  conflicts, that  involve the occupation of farms of  absentee owners by large groups of 
peasants, were typically driven by historical tensions. They are very distinct from the individual squatting 
cases that landowners who live in the communities fear in the rental market.
16 The positive correlation 
between assortative matching and land rental decisions when property rights are insecure is hence unlikely 
to  reflect  reverse  causality  and  correlation  over  time.  Past  land  invasions  do,  however,  create  general 
perceptions of property rights insecurity, which according to our model influence assortative matching in 
the land rental markets. 
The title status of a plot, the measure of formal property rights, is determined by a combination of 
historical factors: different property rights regimes installed by various former colonizing powers, the land 
reforms in the 60s, and the year in which the plot was affected by the reform (beneficiaries of land that was 
expropriated in the early years of the land reforms received titles, others didn’t). Hence, the title status of a 
plot is largely determined by different historical events that are beyond the control of current occupants. 
Note also that the variable indicates whether the plot has a title, not whether it is registered under the name 
of the owner. In fact, in many cases the titles are not updated to the current owner. 
  Given the cross-section nature of our dataset, there might be remaining endogeneity concerns. As 
there is no plausible instrumental variable approach for our data, we instead control for unobservables and 
                                                             
16 The assertion that the prevalence of conflicts is not driven by current land market outcomes and related 
inequality within the community is supported by the very low correlation between land Gini coefficient 
(measuring inequality between community members) and land conflicts in our dataset.  We will also test 
the robustness of our results to inclusion of the land Gini coefficient (see section 5.2).   16 
test  for  robustness  of  the  results.  Our  model  specification  implies  in  itself  control  for  a  number  of 
unobserved effects: the lower level logit (equation 7) is a fixed effect model (i.e., a conditional logit), and 
hence all fixed plot level (and landlord and community level) unobservables are controlled for in all the 
matching regressions. We also present an estimation that includes tenant fixed effects. In the upper level 
logit  we  test  for  robustness  of  our  result  to  inclusion  of  informant  and  community  fixed  effects. 
Furthermore, we show that our results are robust to inclusion of different sets of control variables and 
alternative specifications.  
 
5.  Estimation results 
5.1. Main results 
Estimation of the lower level logit (equation (7)) on the choice by a landlord of a particular tenant 
among potential tenants is reported in Table 2. The regressions were done on the 301 out of 316 rented 
plots for which we have data on both sides of the transaction. The first three columns establish the main 
result of the paper:  Landlords and tenants match assortatively by living standard status and the larger the 
social distance the less likely they are to match (col. 1). These results are robust to controlling for the 
tenant’s characteristics (col. 2).  Assortative matching, however, only takes place in communities that have 
experienced land invasions and is less likely for landlords with large numbers of family members in the 
community (col. 3).  The effects are again stronger when social distance is larger. Hence, the presence of 
conflicts reduces the likelihood of renting out to people whose living standard is different from one’s own, 
and the presence of family within the community increases the likelihood of renting out to people from a 
different  living  standard  class.  The  presence  of  family  in  the  community  is  likely  to  increase  the 
possibilities of contract enforcement, both directly and indirectly: Directly, because alternative enforcement 
mechanisms based on family ties might increase the likelihood of renting out to a family member, even if 
she is from a different socio-economic class. And indirectly because the presence of family members in the 
community can help landlords enforce contracts with third parties, as it increases the costs (loss of social 
benefits) of squatting for tenants.
17 Interestingly, formal titling does not affect matching. This particular 
result might, however, be driven by lack of variation as many of the plots that are actually rented out have a 
formal title.    
Looking at tenants’ characteristics, landlords are more likely to rent out to households with more 
educated  and  male  household  heads,  and  with  machinery.  This  suggests  that  the  positive  effect  of 
productive  assets  on  expected  profit  compensates  the  negative  effect  through  the  reservation  utility. 
                                                             
17 Because we do not have information about the family ties between each landlord and each potential 
tenant, we cannot distinguish between the direct and the indirect effect.     17 
However,  landlords  are  less  likely  to  rent  out  to  tenants  who  already  cultivate  other  plots,  which  is 
consistent with competition between landlords raising the reservation utility of the tenants.
18  
In  column  4,  we  report  a  regression  with  interaction  effects  between  plot  and  tenant 
characteristics.  Among  the  many  potential  interactions,  we  have  only  kept  those  that  are  consistently 
significant across the different possible specifications.  They show that  endowments of machinery and 
education are more important for larger plots, and large families are an advantage for renting in plots with 
irrigation potential.  From our field experience, the latter is related to the fact that irrigation allows for labor 
and capital-intensive cultivation, and large households can provide either supervision and/or a source of 
cash flow for purchasing inputs.  Overall these interaction effects are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
landlord faces a trade-off between the positive effect of a tenant’s assets on expected profit and the negative 
effect on reservation utility, as a tenant’s assets make him more likely to get matched with plots of higher 
productive potential.  
The key results are robust to introduction of an informant cluster effect (col. 5). The next column 
shows a specification excluding variables that are not robustly significant, except for those that also enter 
with interaction effects, which will be used for the calculation of the inclusive value and the simulation.
19 
The last column reports results of the estimates with tenant fixed effects. In this estimation, the set of 
potential matches for each landlord is restricted to the actual tenants in the community since the fixed 
effects cannot be identified for the households that don’t rent from any landlord.  Results show that the 
effect of informal property rights strength (family protection and land invasions) on matching between high 
and low living standard classes is robust to including the fixed effects.  
Estimation results for the upper level logit (equation (8)) for the choice of a landlord to rent out 
are reported in Table 3. The regression was done on the 700 out of 737 plots for which we have complete 
data. The first column reports the core estimation, the second column reports results with informant fixed 
effects,  and  the  third  column  the  results  allowing  for  correlation  across  observations  from  the  same 
informant in both estimation levels. As expected, the inclusive value (derived from the estimation reported 
in Table 2, col. 6), measuring the average utility the landowner can expect from the potential tenants in his 
community, has a positive effect on the decision to rent out. A title on the plot has a positive effect on the 
probability that it be rented out, controlling for the matching. The effects of past land conflicts and family 
protection have, however, no direct effect, but only an indirect effect through their influence on the average 
                                                             
18 The significance of the variable capturing competition in our reduced model estimation suggests that 
additional insights might be gained from estimating a more structural model of such competition, which we 
leave for future work. 
19  The  interaction  effects  with  the  regional  dummy  are,  though  insignificant,  also  included  in  this 
specification, to keep controlling for regional differences.   18 
expected utility of a match. In the last column, we estimate a simplified model to be used in the simulation, 
taking out variables that are not consistently significant or that are potentially endogenous to the choice of 
renting out (engineer and number of active adults in the household).     
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
The hypothesis of positive assortative matching in our model implies that landlords of all classes 
prefer renting to tenants from their own socio-economic class if property rights are insecure. One could 
alternatively hypothesize that the probability of squatting would be higher for poor tenants, and that both 
rich landlords and poor landlords would avoid renting to poor tenants when property rights are insecure. 
Such a mechanism could provide an alternative explanation for the empirical findings presented above. We 
therefore test this hypothesis explicitly by replacing the social distance variables with the tenant’s class. 
The second column in Table 4 shows that, while tenants with low living standards have a lower overall 
probability of being chosen (possibly because poor tenants tend to have less productive assets), none of the 
interaction effects of tenant’s class with the property rights variables are significant.  Hence, we do not find 
empirical  evidence  for  the  alternative  hypothesis,  supporting  our  original  interpretation  of  assortative 
matching because of property rights insecurity.  
A related concern might be that, by measuring the social distance as an absolute value of the 
difference between landlord and tenant characteristics, we have assumed that the effect of social distance is 
independent from the direction of the difference. To test whether property rights insecurity only restricts 
renting from rich landlords to poor tenants, or also in the reverse direction, the model was also estimated 
allowing the coefficient of the interaction terms with the property rights variables to differ depending on 
the direction. Column 3 shows that the results of our base variables are robust to the specification in which 
additional variables were added to allow for these asymmetric effects. The hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the interaction effects with property rights are independent of the direction of the difference cannot be 
rejected. The P-value of the joint F-test of the variables capturing possible asymmetric effects is 0.61. 
 Finally, the assumption that low-regular matches and regular-high matches have the same effects 
was tested by including separate variables allowing the coefficients to be different.  Again, we cannot reject 
that the coefficients of these dummies were significantly different for any of the interaction effects, the P-
value of the joint F-test if 0.37, and the key results are robust (column 4). Hence, overall, the robustness 
checks indicate that property rights insecurity leads to similar assortative matching by social distance in all 
classes, consistent with the theoretical model.  
In addition to property rights insecurity, matching between landlords and tenants might also be 
driven by other factors. The evidence in table 2 suggests that it depends in part on interactions between the   19 
plot  and  tenant  characteristics.  But  it  could  potentially  also  depend  on  the  complementarities  or 
substitutability  between  the  productive  asset  endowments  of  the  landlord  and  the  tenant,  in  line  with 
Becker’s  theory  of  assortative  matching  in  the  marriage  market.  We  therefore  estimated  a  model  that 
controls for differences in asset endowments between landlords and tenants (age, labor, machinery, and 
education). Column 5 shows that there is some evidence for such interactions between landlord and tenant 
characteristics. More importantly, the relationship between property rights and social matching is robust in 
this alternative specification.  
A  different  type  of  concern  could  arise  from  the  use  of  key  informants,  i.e.,  that  informant 
characteristics themselves could be causing an omitted variable problem. We therefore present results that 
control for an  interaction effect between  the  informant’s  living standard  and the  landlord-tenant social 
distance variables (table 5, column 2) and for the difference between living standards of informants and 
tenants (column 3).
20 These variables are not significant and results remain robust. Results of the upper 
level model are also robust to inclusion of dummies indicating the social distance between informant and 
landowner or the living standard class of the informant itself. Hence we do not find evidence of significant 
effects of the informant variables, which reduces concerns related to possible informant bias. 
Next, because there are some communities for which there was more than one informant, and 
because it might be important to allow for clustering of standard errors at the community level, we also 
estimate the regressions allowing for clustering of standard errors by community (column 4). In the upper 
level model, we estimated specifications with a  community (instead of an informant) fixed effect, and 
specifications allowing for clustering at the community level. We find that controlling for community-level 
correlation does not affect the results. 
Another potential concern related to our empirical model is the use of the variable measuring the 
number of other plots to capture competition among landlords. While this variable is exogenous to each 
individual landlord, one could argue that it is determined in the local market together with the matches we 
analyze. Column 5 shows that excluding this variable from the regression does not affect our main results. 
Indeed in the model that included the tenant-fixed effects, this variable was also excluded. The results are 
also robust to alternative characterizations of the effect of landlord competition on the reservation utility of 
the tenants, using either total amount of other land cultivated (column 6) or the total amount per capita 
(column 7).  
Finally,  our  regression  results  are  robust  to  including  interactions  between  social  distance 
variables and the land Gini coefficient (column 8). This indicates that the differences in the prevalence of 
                                                             
20 The class of the informant and any other fixed informant characteristics are further controlled for through 
the fixed effect.   20 
conflicts seem to be related to other factors (such as history of land reform, social cohesion, etc.) rather 
than to differences in current land access inequalities. This might be due to the fact that land inequality is 
high in all the communities.   
 
6. Effects of security of property rights and capital endowment on market size, efficiency, and equity 
To show the importance of property rights security in the reproduction of land access inequality, 
the estimated model is now used to quantify the extent to which both formal and informal property rights 
can limit land access through rental for the poor. In order to do so, we use the estimated parameters to 
simulate the effect of strengthening property rights on land rental market decisions in these local markets.
21 
These simulations give an indication of the importance of property rights insecurity for both equity and 
efficiency outcomes. In addition, we consider the importance of access to working capital for accessing 
land. 
 
6.1. Simulation of the land rental market  
Simulation of the market equilibrium is done for each community separately, with an iterative 
procedure that accounts for competition in the market. The iterative process simulates what is in fact a 
simultaneous process with full information.  For each of the simulations, the probability of being rented 
out, 
  
P di =1 ( )  is  first  predicted  for  each  plot  i,  based  on  the  coefficients  obtained  in  Table  3,  col.  4. 
Consider then a community with I sampled landlord-plots   
  
i  I = 1,K,I { } , each with a sampling weight 
  
 i, and J sampled tenants   
  
j  J = 1,K,J { } , each with a sampling weight 
  
  j .  The full land rental market 
thus includes 
  
I
  =  i i    landlord-plots and 
  
J
  =   j j    tenants.  The market is modeled as working in 
successive rounds of offers from landlords.  In the first round, each landlord-plot makes one offer, selecting 
the tenant j with the highest conditional probability 
  
P dij =1di =1 ( ).
22  In the illustration given in Figure 2, 
for example, landlord i1 selects tenant j1, while landlords i2 and i3 select tenant  j2.  The  tenant only 
accepts  the  offer  that  maximizes 
  
P(di =1)P(dij =1|di =1),  i.e.,  the  tenant  exercises  his  options  in 
choosing the landlord-plot with which he has the highest probability to match.  The probability that the 
match effectively occurs 
  
P dij =1 ( ) is computed as the product of the probability that a given plot is rented 
out 
  
P di =1 ( )  and  the  conditional  probability  of  the  match 
  
P dij =1di =1 ( ).    The  number  of  effective 
                                                             
21 Using specifications from Table 2, col. 6, and Table 3, col. 4.  
22 In the utility framework, this implies that the tenant will only accept a match that maximizes total utility.   21 
matches 
  
 ij  corresponding to a sample match ij is the minimum between the number of landlord-plots 
  
 i 
and the number 
  
  j  of tenants j.  Hence, after the first round matches are settled, each sample match ij 
leaves either some landlord plots 
  
 i    j  not rented, if this number is positive, or some available tenants 
  
  j   i in the opposite case.
23 
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Figure 2.  Simulation of the matching process 
 
The market is then cleared of the matches that have been settled, and we repeat the process until 
all landlord-plots are matched to a tenant.
24 
The outcome of this procedure gives sample matches 
  
ij  M , each with a sampling weight 
  
 ij .  
Note that, by construction, all landlord-plots 
  
i  I are matched to tenants, i.e., 
  
 ij j   = i.
25  Not all 
tenants 
  
j  J, however, are necessarily chosen by a landlord.  If 
  
 ij i   >  j , then all tenants represented 
by sample tenant j can have at least one plot in rental.  But if 
  
 ij i   <  j , then sample tenant j is only 
partially matched in the tenancy market.  It is easier to think about this by splitting j in two tenants: tenant 
j1, with sampling weight 
  
 ij i    who has access to a rental plot, and tenant j2, with sampling weight 
  
  j     ij i    without a rental plot.   
 
                                                             
23 In the first round, tenants will not accept an offer that implies a lower utility than a match with a landlord 
for whom he might be the second choice. Therefore, the results of the iterative process are the same than a 
process in which landlords would be allowed to go for their second choice in the first round (if their first 
choice was not feasible).  
24 Matched tenants stay available for additional matches but the number of plots they cultivate is updated 
after each match, which, because of the negative coefficient on that variable, decreases the likelihood of a 
future match. The number of matches is limited to the actual number of plots tenants rent for those who do 
not want to rent in more land, and not limited for the others.  
25 Note however that many of these plots might have a low probability to be rented out, which is accounted 
for in the simulation through 
  
P di =1 ( ) and which will be reflected in the aggregation (see 6.2).    22 
6.2. Simulated effects of secure property  rights and endowing tenants with capital 
Summary  statistics  reported  in  Table  6  are  obtained  by  aggregating  the  simulated  matches.  
Aggregation of landlord-plot characteristics 
  
vi (such as the total number of plots and area rented out) are 
calculated as: 
  
P di =1 ( ) ivi
i
  . 
Aggregation of tenants characteristics 
  
v j  (such as the number of tenants and the number of poor tenants) 
are calculated as:  
  
min P(di =1)  ij
i
  ,  j
  
  
  
  
  
  
j
  v j . 
Finally, aggregation of matched landlord-tenant characteristics (such as area rented to poor tenant, land-
labor ratio on plots rented by poor landlords) are computed as: 
 
  
P di =1 ( )  ij
j|ij M
  viv j
i
  . 
The first column in Table 6 reports characteristics of the observed rented plots and tenants, and the 
second column reports the characteristics of the simulated plots and tenants. We see that the simulations 
replicate relatively closely the observed situation.  The third column simulates the matches that would 
occur if the property rights to all plots had been secure, i.e., if all plots had a full title, plots had as much 
security as with informal family protection, and there had been no past conflicts in any community. In 
rendering  property  rights  secure,  we  contrast  between  the  role  of  a  title  (column  4),  and  the  role  of 
enhancing protection and reducing land conflicts (column 5).  Column 6 shows the joint effect of property 
rights security and providing working capital (machinery) to all tenants and column 7 the effect of working 
capital alone.   
We see that with secure property rights (column 3), 21% more plots get rented out and 13% more 
households obtain access to rentals. Most of this gain is due to the increase in the inclusive value (the value 
a  landlord  can  expect  from  matches  with  tenants  in  his  community)  that  accompanies  property  rights 
security. Importantly, there is a higher than proportional increase for poor tenants, with a 59% increase in 
their number, 65% in the number of plots rented out to poor tenants, and 63% in the area rented out to poor 
tenants.   
The results suggest that segmentation of the land rental market due to property rights insecurity 
leads to important inefficiencies. With insecure property rights (column 2), the average land-to-labor ratio 
on plots rented out by the non-poor is substantially higher than on plots rented out by the poor (3.44 vs. 
1.13). This suggests that labor might not be optimally allocated. The difference disappears once property   23 
rights are secure (3.11 vs 2.94) (column 3).
26 The difference in availability of machinery (i.e., either the 
tenant  or  the  landowner  has  machinery)  between  plots  rented  by  poor  and  non-poor  landlords  also 
disappears.  
Decomposing the instruments used to make property rights secure is revealing of which programs 
may create the greatest gains in this setting.  Granting formal land titles increases the area rented to the 
poor by 11%, while reducing land conflicts and enhancing land protection increases it by another 55% to 
63%.  This suggests that titling programs as pursued by some donor agencies might only achieve high 
payoffs if accompanied by initiatives to help resolve conflicts and enforce the law.  These latter programs 
have been much less present in efforts to strengthen property rights. 
The last two columns show that a policy intervention that would provide not only secure property 
rights to landlords but also access to working capital to potential tenants would lead to a more equitable 
outcome on the land rental market. With secure property rights and access to capital, the number of plots 
rented to the poor increases by 180%, and the area rented to the poor by 310%. In fact, the poor would rent 
more than half of both plots  and area in  the market.  Comparing these results with the effects of only 
providing working capital, we see that capital and property rights security have complementary effects on 
access to land for the poor. Interestingly, while in the current situation plots owned by non-poor landlords 
are much less intensively cultivated, the difference almost disappears with the combination of these two 
policies.
27 Hence, policies that guarantee the security of property rights and enhance access to working 
capital for potential tenants reinforce each others in putting into place a larger, more equitable, and more 
efficient land rental market.  
 
7. Conclusions  
  Social  inequalities are known to be generally detrimental  to growth and poverty reduction. A 
fundamental question is consequently to uncover how deep levels of inequality get to be reproduced over 
time if they have such high efficiency and equity costs. Insecurity of property rights can play an important 
role as it lowers incentives to invest and use the assets efficiently. If the rich are better able to protect their 
rights,  this  can  lead  to  the  reproduction  and  deepening  of  social  inequalities.  In  this  paper,  we  reveal 
another mechanism that happens via the assets market. This occurs when landlords with insecure rights 
                                                             
26 The overall increase of the land/labor ratio with secure property rights is caused by the fact that there is a 
larger increase in the area rented than in the number of tenants.  
27 Land/labor ratio of landowner’s plots were calculated by taking the weighted average of tenant’s and 
landowner’s  land/labor  ratio,  with  the  probability  of  renting  out  constituting  the  weight.  Tenant’s  and 
landowner’s land/labor ratio were calculated using land cultivated by both after accounting for all matches 
and their probabilities.     24 
protect themselves from loss of their land by confining rental transactions to tenants from the same social 
class. They might do this because social proximity determines the benefits of future social interactions that 
would be lost as a consequence of failing to return rented land, deterring tenant misbehavior. With land 
highly unequally distributed in Latin America, a socially segmented land rental market prevents the poor 
from accessing land held by the rich. The result is not only inefficiency in land use, as much land remains 
extensively used and often idle, but also reproduction of social inequalities. 
Using survey data from the Dominican Republic, this paper has shown that insecurity of property 
rights can have a  large  impact in local land rental markets. The  empirical results suggest that, for the 
regions studied, guaranteeing secure property rights could increase the number of rental transactions by 
21%. Strengthening property rights security not only has substantial consequences for the landowners, but 
also for those with whom the owners might interact in the rental markets. In particular, simulations suggest 
that it would increase access to land for the poor by 63%, while at the same time increasing the efficiency 
of land allocation.  
The  simulations  show  that  large  equity  and  efficiency  gains  are  achieved  when  enforcement 
mechanisms and reduction of large land conflicts accompany the granting of a formal title. This suggests 
that land titling programs should be complemented with reliable land conflict resolution mechanisms in 
order to capture maximum gains. Results also show that participation in the land rental market for the poor 
is constrained by lack of access to working capital. Simulations suggest that increasing both tenure security 
and the machinery  endowments of tenants would increase the number of poor that get  access to land 
through rental by 151% and the total area rented by the poor by 310%. Formal land titling, reduction of 
land conflicts induced in large part by ill-designed programs of access to land and tenant protection, and 
enforcement of property rights, complemented by greater access to capital for the working poor, can thus 
be important instruments for the reduction of local inefficiencies and stubbornly high inequalities.    25 
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Table 1. Distribution of transactions by living standard of tenant and landlord 
  in communities with and without recent land invasions
Living standard  Number of
of landlord Low Regular High Total observations
Communities with recent land invasions
Low 52% 41% 7% 100% 46
Regular 21% 52% 27% 100% 70
High 7% 33% 60% 100% 45
Total 26% 43% 30% 100% 161
Communities without recent land invasions
Low 33% 48% 19% 100% 54
Regular 25% 45% 30% 100% 47
High 41% 36% 23% 100% 39
Total 33% 43% 24% 100% 140
Living standard of tenant
 
   29   30 
   31 
Table 4. Landlord choice of tenant with different specifications: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenant's  Assymetric Unequal Assortative 
Base class Effects Distance 1 Matching
Social Distance landlord-tenant with interaction terms
|1 livingstandard|*family protection 0.452** 0.533 0.661* 0.392
(2.00) (1.40) (1.86) (1.57)
|2 livingstandard|*family protection 1.428*** 0.996* 1.498*** 1.312***
(2.77) (1.67) (2.86) (2.78)
|1 livingstandard|*land invasion -0.588* -0.820* -0.851 -0.642*
(1.73) (1.80) (1.47) (1.90)
|2 livingstandard|*land invasion -1.988*** -2.111** -2.197*** -2.207***
(4.40) (2.47) (4.72) (4.27)
|1 livingstandard|*rice region -0.504 -0.585 -1.262** -0.334
(1.44) (1.60) (2.08) (0.89)
|2 livingstandard|*rice region -0.125 -0.991 -0.329 0.198
(0.22) (0.98) (0.51) (0.29)
Tenant's living standard (and interaction terms)
Regular -0.539
(1.33)
Low -1.330**
(2.26)
Regular*family protection -0.254
(0.76)
Low*family protection 0.196
(0.59)
Regular*land invasion 0.206
(0.41)
Low*land invasion 0.351
(0.45)
Regular*rice region 1.019
(1.61)
Low*rice region 0.786
(1.11)
Difference in productive assets between landlords and tenants
|  number of adult household members| -0.057
(0.40)
|  age household head| 0.009
(1.33)
|  education level household head| 0.031
(0.28)
|  machinery ownership| 0.302*
(1.79)
Interaction plot-tenant characteristics yes yes yes yes no
Assymetric effects social distance no no yes no no
Difference between high-regular and regular-low no no no  yes no
Observations
Number of landlord-plots 288 288 288 288 296
Average number of potential tenants per plot 80 80 80 80 80
 All regressions include controls for social distance between landlord and tenant; and tenant characteristics.
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (standard errors clustered by informant)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 |1 living standard| is a dummy variable for landlord and tenant being from low and regular living standard, or from regular and 
high living standards.   |2 living standard| is a dummy variable for landlord and tenant being from low and high living standard.  32 
Table 5. Landlord choice of tenant : futher robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social dist. Social dist.  Without Other land
* informant informant Community other cultivaed Other land
Base class - tenant cluster plots per capita cultivated Gini
Social Distance landlord-tenant with interaction terms
|1 livingstandard|*family protection 0.452** 0.480** 0.449** 0.452** 0.437* 0.455** 0.457** 0.464**
(2.00) (2.15) (2.01) (2.00) (1.92) (2.02) (2.03) (1.97)
|2 livingstandard|*family protection 1.428*** 1.385*** 1.423*** 1.428*** 1.256*** 1.365*** 1.346*** 1.413***
(2.77) (2.58) (2.68) (2.97) (2.83) (2.90) (2.88) (3.02)
|1 livingstandard|*land invasion -0.588* -0.594* -0.590* -0.588* -0.561* -0.558 -0.555 -0.433*
(1.73) (1.73) (1.72) (1.91) (1.68) (1.64) (1.64) (1.83)
|2 livingstandard|*land invasion -1.988*** -1.997*** -1.989*** -1.988*** -1.902*** -1.875*** -1.843*** -1.894***
(4.40) (4.39) (4.36) (4.69) (4.58) (4.35) (4.43) (4.77)
|1 livingstandard|*rice region -0.504 -0.486 -0.508 -0.504 -0.497 -0.518 -0.521 -1.048***
(1.44) (1.53) (1.47) (1.40) (1.49) (1.54) (1.55) (2.69)
|2 livingstandard|*rice region -0.125 -0.164 -0.132 -0.125 -0.238 -0.210 -0.265 -0.930*
(0.22) (0.31) (0.23) (0.23) (0.53) (0.40) (0.53) (1.70)
Social Distance landlord-tenant with additional controls
|1 livingstandard|*informant class 0.289
(0.53)
|2 livingstandard|*informant class -0.468
(0.69)
|1 livingstandard(informant-tenant)| -0.016
(0.12)
|2 livingstandard(informant-tenant)| 0.046
(0.06)
|1 livingstandard|*land Gini -8.534***
(3.90)
|2 livingstandard|*land Gini -10.299***
(3.66)
Tenant’s assets and characteristics
Number of other plots cultivated -0.310** -0.314** -0.311** -0.310* -0.332**
(2.10) (2.16) (2.10) (1.85) (2.32)
Amount of other land cultivated -0.003*
(1.86)
Amount of other land cultivated per capita -0.006*
(1.75)
Observations
Number of landlord-plots 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
Average number of potential tenants per plot 80 80 80 80 80 80 79 80
Informant correlation Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
 All regressions include controls for social distance between landlord and tenant; for other tenant characteristics, and for interaction between plot-tenant characteristics
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
  |2 living standard| is a dummy variable for landlord and tenant being from low and high living standards.
1 |1 living standard| is a dummy variable for landlord and tenant being from low and regular living standard, or from regular and high living standards.   33 
Table 6. Characteristics of simulated matched plots and tenants with different policy interventions
Title, 
Title,  Only protection, and
Observed  Simulated protection, and Only protection, and no conflict Only
values values no conflict title no conflict with capital capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quantitative effects*
Number of plots 302 307 21% 6% 14% 54% 30%
Number of plots to poor tenants 89 89 65% 10% 57% 180% 75%
Number of tenants 246 245 13% 6% 9% 55% 45%
Number of poor tenants 85 86 59% 10% 52% 151% 72%
Total area rented (ha) 526 543 20% 4% 15% 66% 40%
Total area rented to poor (ha) 102 114 63% 11% 55% 310% 115%
Equity effects
Percent of plots to poor tenants 29 29 40 30 40 53 39
Percent of poor among tenants 35 35 50 36 49 57 42
Percent of area rented to poor 19 21 29 22 28 52 32
Efficiency effects
Land/labor ratio on plots rented out by poor
a 1.01 1.13 2.94 1.24 3.1 3.46 1.32
Land/labor ratio on plots rented out by non-poor
a 2.28 3.44 3.11 3.42 2.91 2.11 2.55
Machinery on plots rented out by poor
b 0.23 0.39 0.59 0.38 0.61 - -
Machinery on plots rented out by non-poor
b 0.54 0.65 0.61 0.65 0.61 - -
Land/labor ratio on plots owned by the poor
c 0.88 0.75 1.42 0.80 1.42 1.75 0.79
Land/labor ratio on plots owned by the non-poor
c 2.50 2.64 2.52 2.66 2.42 1.97 2.22
Simulations are based on estimations in Tables 2 (col. 6) and 3 (col. 4).
* Columns 3-7 report the % change relative to the simulated value in column 2.
a Total amount of land cultivated by the tenant household divided by the number of adult households members
b Dummy variable equals 1 if either landowner or tenant owns machinery
c Weighed average of plots rented to others and owner-cultivated plots
Secure property rights
Insecure property rights
 